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Abstract
Phishing is the spoofing of Internet websites or emails aimed at tricking users into entering
sensitive information, with such goals as financial or identity theft. The current study sought
to determine whether age is associated with increased susceptibility to phishing and whether
tests of executive functioning can predict phishing susceptibility. A total of 193 cognitively
intact participants, 91 younger adults and 102 older adults, were primarily recruited through a
Psychology department undergraduate subject pool and a gerontology research registry,
respectively. The Executive Functions Module from the Neuropsychological Assessment
Battery and the Iowa Gambling Task were the primary cognitive predictors of reported phish-
ing suspiciousness. Other predictors included age group (older vs. younger), sex, education,
race, ethnicity, prior knowledge of phishing, prior susceptibility to phishing, and whether or
not browsing behaviors were reportedly different in the laboratory setting versus at home. A
logistic regression, which accounted for a 22.7% reduction in error variance compared to the
null model and predicted phishing suspiciousness with 73.1% (95% CI [66.0, 80.3]) accuracy,
revealed three statistically significant predictors: the main effect of education (b = 0.58, SE =
0.27) and the interactions of age group with prior awareness of phishing (b = 2.31, SE = 1.12)
and performance on the Neuropsychological Assessment Battery Mazes test (b = 0.16, SE =
0.07). Whether or not older adults reported being suspicious of the phishing attacks used in
this study was partially explained by educational history and prior phishing knowledge. This
suggests that simple educational interventions may be effective in reducing phishing vulnera-
bility. Although one test of executive functioning was found useful for identifying those at risk
of phishing susceptibility, four tests were not found to be useful; these results speak to the
need for more ecologically valid tools in clinical neuropsychology.
Introduction
Phishing is the spoofing of Internet websites or emails aimed at tricking users into entering
sensitive information, such as usernames and passwords [1]. It is one of the most severe and
challenging threats to Internet security. As Internet accessibility continues to increase, and as
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the sophistication of phishing attacks continues to improve [2], individuals of all ages and
backgrounds are increasingly susceptible to this threat. Falling victim to a phishing attempt
may lead to identity theft and loss of financial resources [3]. In older adults, these outcomes
may have important consequences for living independently and for maintaining social, emo-
tional, and medical health.
An abundance of research in the computer sciences and human factors fields has addressed
phishing susceptibility and its association with demographic variables. For instance, Metzger
et al. [4] reported that students were more likely to trust all information channels and less
likely to verify online information compared to nonstudents. Sheng et al. [5] found that
women and people between 18 and 25 years old were less suspicious of phishing than people
of other ages. The effect of age on phishing susceptibility was largely explained by prior experi-
ence with phishing, experience using the Internet, perception of financial risk, and years of
education. The average age of their sample, recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk,
was 30; but because no other information about the participants’ age was reported, the com-
position of older adults in that study is unclear [5]. Using a role-play paradigm similar to
Sheng and colleagues [5], Welk et al. [6] found that “personality characteristics that support
reserved behavior, low impulsivity, and distrust decreased phishing susceptibility within an
email-based decision making task” (p. 13). The increased impulsivity that is often characteris-
tic of younger adults has been proposed as another mechanism governing the increased phish-
ing susceptibility reported in this cohort. However, it should be noted that some studies have
failed to demonstrate increased susceptibility in the 18–25 age group compared to older
groups; for example, Zielinska et al. [7] found no difference between young people (age 18–25)
and other people (age 26) in phishing susceptibility. Nevertheless, no studies of phishing
susceptibility to date have focused specifically on older adults (i.e., age 50+).
Similarly, few studies have focused on examining the value of cognitive abilities in predict-
ing phishing susceptibility. Vishwanath and colleagues have reported a series of studies show-
ing that the degree to which participants pay attention to and recall the details of a phishing
email are related to whether or not victimization occurs [8–10]. Hong and colleagues [11]
measured working memory, crystallized intelligence, spatial skills, and sustained attention in
their sample of younger adults, but did not report data related to the association between these
cognitive abilities and performance on a phishing detection task. Finally, Purkait et al. [12]
found positive associations between phishing detection and experimental measures of atten-
tional vigilance and short-term memory. There are no other studies known to have evaluated
the predictive validity of cognitive measures for phishing outcomes.
In the field of clinical neuropsychology, there is a large corpus of research that has focused
on the use of cognitive tests to predict real-world functional outcomes, including instrumental
activities of daily living (IADLs) such as financial management, driving, and medication
adherence [13]. These ecological validity studies are commonly pursued in an older adult
population due to the increased risk of aging-related cognitive disorders and their associated
functional disabilities [14]. Given the now prevalent use of the Internet and smartphone appli-
cations for the organization and management of daily tasks such as shopping, banking, and
social networking, predictions about real-world functional outcomes ought to include mea-
sures of technology use and its associated risks. The use of technology such as online shopping
and banking may represent an enhanced activity of daily living (EADL; [15]) that serves to
improve quality of life, whereas one’s ability to resist phishing and other scams may be best
conceptualized as an IADL. Despite the threats posed by phishing, one’s ability to recognize
and avoid phishing attacks has not been a common focus of research from the perspective of
clinical neuropsychology and ecological validity. The current study was designed to bridge
this gap in the literature, with the goals of adding a clinical and ecological perspective to the
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existing security-focused literature on phishing as well as taking the first steps toward promot-
ing the assessment and prediction of phishing susceptibility across age groups.
Current older adult cohorts may be particularly vulnerable to phishing attempts. In fact,
older adults appear to be disproportionately targeted for many types of fraud, including financial
exploitation [16] as a result of their greater potential for wealth; decreased familiarity, comfort,
and self-efficacy using computers; less experience with web browsing [17–20]; and increased
risk for age-related cognitive decline [21]. Even in the absence of mild cognitive impairment
(MCI) or dementia, older adults may exhibit impairments in decision-making [22]. For exam-
ple, age-related decline in executive functioning is associated with a decline in functional capaci-
ties, such as financial management [23–25]. Research has consistently demonstrated that tests of
executive functioning can be useful for the prediction of IADLs, especially in older adults with
cognitive impairment due to neurodegenerative diseases [26–29]. For example, the Iowa Gam-
bling Task (IGT) measures decision-making in ambiguous situations, which is believed to be
important for performing IADLs [30]. Other research has demonstrated associations between
IADL functioning and scores on tests of judgment and decision-making [31,32], maze naviga-
tion [33], abstract reasoning and concept formation [34], and verbal fluency [35].
Avoiding online fraud is becoming an important component of one’s capacity to function
independently. This is especially true for emerging cohorts of older adults who rely heavily on
electronic storage of personal information, as through online banking applications, electronic
medical records, and cloud-based storage systems. Clinicians working with older adults with
known or suspected cognitive impairment may wish to assess this capacity to predict susceptibil-
ity and intervene when appropriate [36]. Recent advances in the conceptualization and assess-
ment of capacity have cautioned against treating this construct as a single entity; instead, it is
recommended that capacity be conceptualized as applying to a particular function (e.g., capacity
to make financial decisions) [37]. Under this approach, the prediction of phishing susceptibility
represents a specific type of capacity that may wish to be addressed to protect vulnerable individ-
uals from financial abuse and identity theft. As current cohorts of digital natives age into older
adulthood, assessing the capacity to detect phishing attempts will undoubtedly become an essen-
tial focus of clinical assessment.
The current study sought to identify and compare the relationship between cognitive func-
tioning—in particular, executive functioning ability—and phishing susceptibility in younger
and older adult samples. Because older adults are generally less familiar with computers [18–
20] and are more likely to experience declines in abilities such as judgment and decision-mak-
ing [21], we hypothesized that the older adult cohort would be more vulnerable to phishing
attempts than the younger adult cohort. In addition, we hypothesized that commonly used
tests of executive functioning, especially those measuring judgment and decision-making,
would be predictive of phishing susceptibility.
Materials and methods
Participants
A total of 207 participants were recruited as volunteers for this study. Because we could not
use the data from 10 participants due to technological errors and 4 participants for other rea-
sons (confusion, n = 2; forgot login information, n = 2), the total sample size used in the cur-
rent analysis was 193. The younger adult sample (n = 91) was primarily recruited through the
Psychology department’s undergraduate subject pool at the University of Colorado Colorado
Springs (UCCS), receiving course credit or extra credit for participation. The older adult sam-
ple (n = 102) was recruited from the community using a variety of methods, including a Uni-
versity Gerontology Center research registry, targeted newspaper advertisements, flyers,
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community lectures, and word of mouth. Older adults were compensated $15 for their partici-
pation. Inclusion criteria required use of the Internet at least once per month and possession
of common Internet website accounts (e.g., Amazon, Google). Exclusion criteria were as fol-
lows: traumatic brain injury within the last three months, diagnosis of a major mental illness
(e.g., Schizophrenia), use of medications that interfere with cognition, and diagnosis of
dementia or other neurological condition. For older adults, the telephone version of the Mem-
ory Impairment Screen (MIS-T) [38] was administered to ensure that participants were cogni-
tively intact; participants who scored 5 or lower (cut-off for suspected impairment) on the
MIS-T were excluded.
Procedure
The study received human subjects approval from the University of Colorado Colorado
Springs Institutional Review Board. A trained graduate or undergraduate research assistant
conducted all data collection in Psychology lab space on campus. At the outset of the study,
participants provided written informed consent, answered a demographics questionnaire, and
were administered a battery of executive functioning tests (described below). Participants were
then asked to perform a series of web-browsing activities, including evaluation of websites’
login notifications, and to then rate their stylistic preferences by site. Participants were not
aware that these activities would involve phishing attempts to obtain their login credentials.
Immediately before the web-browsing tasks, the examiner emphasized the voluntary nature
of the study to participants and provided reassurance that the tasks could be discontinued at
any time without penalty. After the examiner left the room, participants visited four different
websites, two of which were legitimate sites and two of which were phishing sites that we cre-
ated. Of the two total phishing sites, one login utilized traditional methods (i.e., entering one’s
username and password for that site) and one utilized single sign-on (SSO) methods (i.e., log-
ging into a website such as Sears.com using an identity provider account, such as Facebook or
Google). The order of the legitimate and phishing websites, and the traditional vs. SSO web-
sites, was counterbalanced. Participants’ interactions with these sites were monitored remotely
to determine whether and where login attempts were made. No sensitive login information
was recorded, transmitted, or stored when participants interacted with the phishing websites.
Phishing websites were hosted on university servers and designed to accurately mimic the
target websites, so that activities such as clicking on links, searching, and logging in would
behave identically to target websites. URLs of the phishing websites were created with the
explicit purpose of alerting participants to the forgery site (e.g., http://www.amazon.jigdee.
com instead of http://www.amazon.com). Figs 1 and 2 present examples of phishing websites
used in this study. Fig 1 shows a screenshot of the phishing testbed’s replica of the Amazon.
com homepage and Fig 2 shows a dynamically generated deep-level replica of the Amazon.
com website. A more complete description of the phishing testbed has been published previ-
ously [1]. The phishing testbed can also be accessed through our project website, hosted at
http://inside.mines.edu/~chuanyue/NSF/NSF1624149.html.
After participants completed the web-browsing task, the examiner returned to the room
and administered several questionnaires about the web-browsing activity without disclosing
the phishing attempts. The questionnaires asked whether the participants noticed anything
suspicious about the websites, whether their approach to the web-browsing task would have
differed if they were at home rather than in a lab, whether they had prior knowledge of phish-
ing, and whether they had previously been victimized by phishing. A copy of the questionnaire
is included as S1 Appendix. After the completion of these questionnaires, participants were
debriefed about the true purpose of the study and compensated for their time.
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Neuropsychological measures
Neuropsychological Assessment Battery (NAB) executive functions module. The NAB
Executive Functions Module [39] contains four tests that measure an array of abilities related
to executive functioning. The scores on these four tests can be combined to produce a demo-
graphically corrected (age, sex, and education) Executive Functions Index Score (M = 100,
SD = 15) that characterizes global executive functioning abilities. On all NAB tests, higher
scores reflect better performance.
NAB Mazes. The NAB Mazes test (range = 0–26) requires participants to complete up to
seven pen-and-paper mazes that increase in difficulty. Points are earned for completing the
mazes within the allotted time, with more points awarded for more rapid completion times.
Fig 1. Example of a Phishing Home Page Encountered by Study Participants. A dynamically generated
homepage on the Amazon phishing website (it presents the same content that is actually displayed on the
legitimate Amazon website).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0171620.g001
Fig 2. Example of a Deep-Level Phishing Web Page Encountered by Study Participants. A dynamically
generated deep-level webpage on the Amazon phishing website (any level of webpages can be generated
and presented to users in real-time).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0171620.g002
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NAB Judgment. The NAB Judgment test (range = 0–20) asks participants to answer 10
questions about health and safety situations and has demonstrated ecological validity for vari-
ous decision-making tasks [31,32].
NAB Categories. The NAB Categories test presents participants with pictures of six fictional
people, along with details about each person. The participant is asked to classify the six-pic-
tured individuals into two characteristically based groups of two to four people according to
information presented. Groupings can be based on a variety of concrete and abstract features.
The test consists of two trials, with identical rules but different pictured individuals. Accurate
groupings are awarded points from 0–2.
NAB Word Generation. The NAB Word Generation test asks participants to generate as
many three-letter words as possible from a pictured series of seven letters. Correct words are
awarded 1 point.
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). The IGT [40] asks participants to imagine they are loaned
money to play a card game, where each card picked from one of four decks causes them to win
or lose money. Participants are instructed to win as much money as possible, but are not
warned that the decks possess distinct patterns and systematic differences in credits and debits.
Higher Net Total raw scores reflect the prioritization of better decks (and better decision-mak-
ing) when picking cards. Past research has supported the relationship between low IGT scores,
poor decision-making, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex dysfunction [41,42].
Data analysis
All analyses were performed in R version 3.3.2 [43]. An a priori alpha level was set at .05. The
study’s primary hypothesis was tested with logistic regression via the lrm function in the rms
package version 5.0–1 [44]. Missing data were handled using multiple imputation with five
imputed data sets. Initially, phishing susceptibility was intended to be the primary dependent
variable, but a lack of variance in this outcome was found (only 12 participants declined to login
to the phishing websites). Therefore, the dependent variable chosen instead was whether or not
participants reported feeling suspicious of one or more websites during the browsing activities.
Suspiciousness (yes/no) was modeled as a function of the following predictor variables: Prior
knowledge of phishing (yes/no); prior susceptibility to phishing (yes/no); lab vs. home differences
in approach (yes/no); education (years); sex (male/female); ethnicity (Hispanic/not Hispanic);
race (Caucasian/not Caucasian); NAB Mazes, Judgment, Categories, and Word Generation (raw
scores); and IGT Net Total (raw score). In addition to these main effects, the interactions between
these variables and Age Group (younger/older) were also modeled to investigate if age group
moderates the ability of predictor variables to explain phishing suspiciousness.
Results
Participant demographic data, cognitive test results, and answers to phishing questionnaires
are presented in Table 1. On the IGT, three participants admitted and two demonstrated
(through perfect or nearly perfect scores) prior knowledge of the task; therefore, we omitted
IGT scores for these five participants. As described above, only 12 were not vulnerable to the
experimental phishing attacks. All 12 participants who chose not to enter their login informa-
tion to the phishing sites were older adults. Of these 12 older adult participants, 10 reported
prior knowledge of phishing and 4 reported being victims of phishing in the past; their mean
age was 69.17 (SD = 9.4) and their mean years of education was 16.5 (SD = 2.11). Compared to
the number of participants who were victimized by the experimental phishing attacks in the
current study, there was more variability about reported suspiciousness, with 68 participants
reporting something suspicious about one or more of the websites.
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Overall, the younger adult group contained a greater proportion of individuals of non-Cau-
casian race, χ2 (df = 1) = 11.89, p = 0.001, and Hispanic/Latino/Spanish ethnicity, χ2 (df = 1) =
17.53, p< 0.001. Older adults had more years of education, t (df = 168.32) = -9.10, p< 0.001.
The younger adult group performed better on NAB Mazes, t (df = 183.67) = 7.35, p< 0.001,
and NAB Categories, t (df = 190.82) = 2.58, p = 0.011, while the older adult group demon-
strated better overall executive functioning on the demographically-corrected NAB Executive
Functions Index score, t (df = 179.58) = -6.73, p< 0.001, and produced higher scores on the
NAB Word Generation test, t (df = 188.19) = -2.99, p = 0.003. More older adults than younger
adults reported knowledge of phishing, χ2 (df = 1) = 7.56, p = 0.006. They were also more likely
to have been victimized by phishing in the past, χ2 (df = 1) = 13.46, p< 0.001, and more likely
to report that their web-browsing behaviors were different in the laboratory setting versus at
home, χ2 (df = 1) = 16.33, p< 0.001. No other group differences were observed on any of the
variables reported in Table 1.
The results of the logistic regression demonstrated that the predictor variables contributed
to a 22.7% advantage for the hypothesized model over an intercept-only model (Nagelkerke
R2), χ2 (df = 25) = 34.85, p = 0.092. Detailed results of the logistic regression model are pre-
sented in Table 2. As can be seen from Table 2, there were two significant main effects (years
of education and NAB Mazes raw score); in addition, prior knowledge of phishing and scores
on NAB Mazes were significantly moderated by Age Group. These effects are depicted graphi-
cally in Fig 3. The model correctly classified participants’ phishing suspiciousness with 73.1%
(95% CI [66.0, 80.3]) accuracy.
Discussion
This study sought to determine whether older adults are more susceptible to computer-based
phishing attacks and whether cognitive test scores can predict phishing susceptibility. Because
Table 1. Participant Demographics, Cognitive Test Scores, and Questionnaire Responses.
Variable Total Younger Older
N 193 91 102
Mean Age, years (SD) [range]* 45.70 (22.63) [18, 88] 22.90 (5.90) [18, 44] 66.05 (7.50) [50, 88]
Mean Education, years (SD) [range]* 14.93 (1.98) [12, 20] 13.8 (1.20) [12, 16] 15.94 (2.00) [12, 20]
Female Sex, N (%) 134 (69.79%) 62 (68.13%) 72 (71.29%)
Caucasian Race, N (%)* 154 (82.35%) 63 (71.59%) 91 (91.92%)
Hispanic Ethnicity, N (%)* 34 (18.09%) 28 (30.77%) 6 (6.19%)
First Language English, N (%) 181 (95.26%) 83 (92.22%) 98 (98.00%)
NAB EF Index, M (SD) [range]* 106.17 (17.70) [64, 151] 98.12 (12.68) [65, 125] 113.35 (18.49) [64, 151]
NAB Mazes, M (SD) [range]* 16.99 (6.66) [2, 26] 20.25 (4.88) [7, 26] 14.09 (6.71) [2, 26]
NAB Judgment, M (SD) [range] 15.37 (2.66) [6, 20] 15.32 (2.33) [7, 20] 15.42 (2.94) [6, 20]
NAB Categories, M (SD) [range]* 27.78 (9.57) [3, 53] 29.63 (9.01) [9, 53] 26.13 (9.80) [3, 51]
NAB Word Generation M (SD) [range]* 11.82 (4.72) [2, 28] 10.78 (4.02) [2, 22] 12.75 (5.10) [3, 28]
IGT Net Total, M (SD) [range] 19.11 (27.00) [–54, 72] 17.84 (25.74) [–54, 62] 20.18 (28.09) [–44, 72]
Suspicious of Websites, N (%) 68 (35.23%) 26 (28.57%) 42 (41.18%)
Knowledge of Phishing, N (%)* 155 (80.31%) 65 (71.43%) 90 (88.24%)
Past Victim of Phishing, N (%)* 78 (40.62%) 24 (26.37%) 54 (53.47%)
Reported Lab vs. Home Difference, N (%)* 64 (33.68%) 17 (18.68%) 47 (47.47%)
NAB = Neuropsychological Assessment Battery; IGT = Iowa Gambling Task.
* Significant difference between younger and older adults (p < .05).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0171620.t001
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very few participants declined to log in to the experimental phishing websites, we used
reported suspiciousness as our dependent variable. Overall, the logistic regression model was
able to achieve a classification accuracy of 73.1% (95% CI [66.0, 80.3]) in predicting whether or
not participants would be suspicious of the experimental phishing attacks. The results pre-
sented here failed to support our hypothesis that older adults would be more susceptible to
phishing than younger adults. Although the results indicate that being an older adult was asso-
ciated with 3.69 times greater odds of being suspicious relative to younger adults, this parame-
ter was estimated too imprecisely to interpret with confidence (Table 2). There was partial
support for our hypothesis that executive functioning tests would be predictive of phishing
susceptibility. One test, NAB Mazes, was predictive of phishing susceptibility. Other executive
functioning test scores were not important predictors of phishing susceptibility. More specific
findings are discussed below.
Table 2. Results of the Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting Phishing Suspiciousness.
Predictor b SE 95% CIb z p OR 95% CIOR
Intercept -5.46 4.11 [-13.51, 2.59] -1.33 .184 0.00 [0.00, 13.37]
Main Effects
Age Group 1.31 4.78 [-8.07, 10.68] 0.27 .785 3.69 [0.00, 43655.35]
Prior Knowledge -0.85 0.71 [-2.23, 0.54] -1.20 .230 0.43 [0.11, 1.71]
Past Susceptibility -0.05 0.69 [-1.41, 1.31] -0.08 .938 0.95 [0.24, 3.69]
Lab vs. Home 1.07 0.68 [-0.26, 2.41] 1.58 .115 2.92 [0.77, 11.10]
Education 0.58* 0.27 [0.05, 1.10] 2.16 .031 1.78 [1.05, 3.01]
Sex 0.06 0.65 [-1.20, 1.33] 0.10 .922 1.06 [0.30, 3.77]
Ethnicity -0.40 0.65 [-1.69, 0.88] -0.62 .538 0.67 [0.19, 2.41]
Race -0.97 0.72 [-2.39, 0.45] -1.34 .180 0.38 [0.09, 1.56]
NAB Mazes -0.14* 0.06 [-0.25, -0.02] -2.33 .020 0.87 [0.78, 0.98]
NAB Judgment 0.05 0.12 [-0.19, 0.29] 0.42 .676 1.05 [0.83, 1.34]
NAB Categories -0.01 0.04 [-0.08, 0.05] -0.40 .687 0.99 [0.92, 1.06]
NAB Word Generation -0.01 0.08 [-0.17, 0.15] -0.11 .912 0.99 [0.84, 1.17]
IGT Net Total -0.02* 0.01 [-0.05, 0.00] -2.02 .044 0.98 [0.96, 1.00]
Interaction Effects
AG x PK 2.31* 1.12 [0.11, 4.51] 2.05 .040 10.07 [1.11, 91.17]
AG x PS 0.29 0.84 [-1.36, 1.94] 0.34 .732 1.33 [0.26, 6.94]
AG x LH -0.99 0.82 [-2.60, 0.63] -1.20 .231 0.37 [0.07, 1.88]
AG x Education -0.49 0.29 [-1.06, 0.09] -1.66 .096 0.62 [0.35, 1.09]
AG x Sex -0.48 0.82 [-2.08, 1.13] -0.58 .562 0.62 [0.12, 3.10]
AG x Ethnicity 1.29 1.23 [-1.11, 3.70] 1.05 .291 3.65 [0.33, 40.34]
AG x Race 1.71 1.10 [-0.45, 3.87] 1.55 .122 5.52 [0.63, 48.06]
AG x NAB Mazes 0.16* 0.07 [0.02, 0.29] 2.30 .022 1.17 [1.02, 1.34]
AG x NAB Judgment -0.06 0.15 [-0.35, 0.23] -0.41 .679 0.94 [0.70, 1.26]
AG x NAB Categories 0.00 0.05 [-0.09, 0.09] 0.05 .961 1.00 [0.92, 1.10]
AG x NAB Word Generation 0.09 0.10 [-0.10, 0.28] 0.89 .373 1.09 [0.90, 1.32]
AG x IGT Net Total 0.02 0.01 [-0.01, 0.05] 1.51 .131 1.02 [0.99, 1.05]
OR = Odds ratio; NAB = Neuropsychological Assessment Battery; IGT = Iowa Gambling Task; AG = Age Group; PK = Prior Knowledge; PS = Past
Susceptibility; LH = Lab vs. Home. For categorical predictor variables, reference groups are younger (Age Group), no prior knowledge of phishing (Prior
Knowledge), no past phishing susceptibility (Past Susceptibility), no difference between lab and home (Lab vs. Home), female (Sex), non-Hispanic
(Ethnicity), and Caucasian (Race).
* p < .05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0171620.t002
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Compared to younger adults, older adults were more likely to have knowledge of phishing
and more likely to have been victimized by phishing in the past. In addition, older adults
appeared to have been less trusting of the research setting, as they were more likely to report
using different browsing behaviors in the lab versus at home, and all 12 participants who
resisted the phishing attacks were older adults. Older adults’ suspiciousness varied markedly
depending on whether or not they possessed prior knowledge of phishing. When broken
Fig 3. Predictors of Phishing Susceptibility Derived from Logistic Regression. Main effect of years of
education on reported phishing suspiciousness (A). Age group interaction effects with prior phishing
knowledge (B) and NAB Mazes score (C). Error bars and shaded bands represent 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0171620.g003
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down by prior knowledge (Fig 3B), the most suspicious of the subgroups was the older adults
with prior knowledge of phishing, whereas the least suspicious subgroup was the older adults
without prior knowledge of phishing. In contrast, younger adults without prior knowledge of
phishing reported more suspiciousness than those with prior knowledge. Because all of the
younger adults—whether suspicious or not—entered their login information into phishing
sites, this suggests that younger adults may have been too trusting of the laboratory environ-
ment. Consistent with the findings of Metzger and colleagues [4], our younger adult partici-
pants, all of whom were students at the university where this study was performed, trusted the
experimental setting and the website content. For older adults, personal experience (having
been victimized by phishing) and associated prior knowledge may have offered useful protec-
tion against fraud. For younger adults, experience and information may have had the opposite
effect by creating implicit trust in the research setting, which likely includes trust about IT
security. Also as expected, people with more years of education tended to be more suspicious
of the phishing attempts (Table 2), which is consistent with previous research suggesting that
years of education moderates the influence of age group on susceptibility to phishing [5]. It is
likely that educational background is related to factors associated with learning and cognition,
but it may also serve as a proxy for experience and familiarity with computers, as has been pre-
viously reported [17]. Unlike other studies (e.g., [5,11,45]), we found no differences in phish-
ing suspiciousness between men and women.
Only one cognitive test, NAB Mazes, was strongly associated with phishing suspiciousness.
The interaction between this variable and age group produced an unexpected pattern, how-
ever. In older adults, better test scores were associated with more suspiciousness, as expected.
But in younger adults, better test scores were associated with less suspiciousness (Fig 3). The
best explanation for this pattern may be that the abilities measured by NAB Mazes (processing
speed, planning) serve different roles for younger and older adults: for younger adults, these
executive functions contribute to efficient, automatic processing, especially in situations that
are perceived as trustworthy (e.g., using campus computers); for older adults, these executive
functions may contribute to more deliberative, self-protecting behaviors, especially when they
are knowledgeable about risks (e.g., phishing and web browsing) [46]. Similarly, it may be the
case that the NAB Mazes test measures slightly different abilities in older versus younger
adults. For example, in older adults, the NAB Mazes test may draw more heavily on skills such
as visual scanning and spatial navigation; older adults who are better at these skills may be
more adept at noticing webpage anomalies that increase suspiciousness. In younger adults, in
contrast, the NAB Mazes test may draw more heavily on information processing speed and
mental efficiency; younger adults who are better at these skills may have used cognitive short-
cuts, such as the familiarity heuristic, which could have suppressed detection of webpage
anomalies and reduced suspiciousness [47]. The possibility that the NAB Mazes test draws on
different cognitive abilities in younger and older adults suggests measurement invariance,
which should be a focus of future research on this test and the rest of the NAB Executive Func-
tions module.
In contrast to the effects discussed above, statistical significance was not reached for several
predictor variables, including past phishing susceptibility, lab versus home browsing approach,
sex, race, ethnicity, three tests from the NAB Executive Functions module, and the IGT. These
results suggest that most demographic variables, including age cohort, are insufficient predic-
tors of phishing victimization. Although race and ethnicity were associated with some of the
larger effect sizes (Table 2), these parameters were estimated extremely imprecisely due to the
limited representation of ethnic and racial minorities in the current sample, especially among
older adults (Table 1). Examining phishing susceptibility differences across ethnic and racial
groups is important, as evidence suggests that these groups report different Internet usage
Phishing suspiciousness in older and younger adults: The role of executive functioning
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0171620 February 3, 2017 10 / 16
patterns [17]. These results also suggest that some tests of executive functioning are limited in
their utility to identify potential victims of phishing and possibly other forms of exploitation. It
should be pointed out, however, that both the main and interaction effects of the IGT were very
close to reaching statistical significance (Table 2). Nevertheless, these parameters were estimated
with good precision, suggesting that the ability of IGT scores to predict phishing suspiciousness
is of limited clinical significance regardless of statistical significance. Taken together, the predic-
tor variables used here were able to predict—with an accuracy of 73.1% (95% CI [66.0, 80.3])—
whether or not an individual participant would report suspiciousness. However, because the
logistic regression model only produced a 22.7% reduction in error variance compared to the
null model, it is likely that there are additional unmeasured variables that could greatly contrib-
ute to the prediction of phishing suspiciousness and susceptibility. The current results are best
interpreted as the first step in identifying ecologically valid neuropsychological approaches for
identifying phishing susceptibility and are not suited for classification purposes at the individual
level. Because the current results have not been cross-validated or validated in out-of-set data,
additional studies are needed before using neuropsychological tests to classify individuals based
on predicted phishing susceptibility.
Neuropsychological assessment instruments have been described as having limited ecologi-
cal validity [48,49]. The results of the current study also suggest considerable room for im-
provement in the use of neuropsychological tests for the prediction of real-world functional
outcomes. Neuropsychologists are often asked to evaluate individuals to render judgments
about functional capacities such as financial management and ability to avoid exploitation
[50]. Because phishing represents an emerging threat to individuals lacking in those capacities,
it is necessary for neuropsychologists to have access to clinical tools that are valid for making
such judgments. These results highlight the importance of continued development of assess-
ment techniques that can jointly measure cognitive and functional abilities and that are predic-
tive of real-world outcomes. Cognitive abilities have been shown to play an important role in
older adults’ ability to learn and adapt to advances in computing technology [17], which sug-
gests that the development of novel neuropsychological tests that can better predict computer-
related EADLs and IADLs is of considerable importance.
The current study is limited by the salient influence of the laboratory environment. Out of
the 29 individuals who reported prior knowledge of phishing, prior victimization by phishing,
and suspiciousness of the websites visited, 26 (89.7%) entered their login information into
the spoofed web pages. We attempted to minimize the influence of the laboratory setting by
emphasizing that participants could discontinue any task without penalty, by having examin-
ers leave the room while participants browsed the Internet, and by asking participants to enter
their private login data into real (or seemingly real) websites, some of which may have been
used to store sensitive data (e.g., credit cards). This aspect of the study represents a strength
relative to other research, which often asks participants to indicate how they might respond to
a role-play scenario (e.g., [5,45]) or to simply identify whether a website is legitimate (e.g.,
[11]). However, it appears as though the powerful influences of trust, obedience, and authori-
tarianism affected our participants [51]. Past research has implicated trust as an important
factor influencing phishing susceptibility [52], and current methods used by websites to dem-
onstrate their own trustworthiness are of marginal effectiveness [53]. However, because so few
participants were able to avoid becoming susceptible to phishing, our resulting shift in focus
from susceptibility to suspiciousness may be capturing other non-specific personality traits,
such as skepticism, paranoia, or anxiety, that were not directly related to the phishing attempts
[17,54]. Further, our study may have been improved through the inclusion of additional cogni-
tive predictors of phishing suspiciousness, such as more basic aspects of attention, which have
been proposed as a mechanism for phishing susceptibility in the past (e.g., [9]). However,
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given the fundamental role of attention skills in completing more complex tasks of executive
functioning, it is likely that individual variability in attention skills was captured indirectly
through the battery of executive functioning tests used here [55].
This study is also limited by the fact that our older adult sample was self-selected to partici-
pate in this study and is therefore unlikely to have good external validity for the entire popula-
tion of Internet-using older adults, or older adults who use the internet less frequently than the
minimum of once per month needed to meet our study’s inclusion criteria. Our older adult
sample was highly educated, in possession of higher than average executive functioning abili-
ties, and lacking in racial and ethnic diversity. Approximately 88% of the older adult sample
reported knowledge of phishing (even more than the 71% reported in younger adults), which
may be higher than in the general population of Internet-using older adults. Because almost
53% of the older adults in our sample reported past victimization by phishing attacks, it is pos-
sible that this high rate of phishing knowledge in older adults is caused by high rates of past
victimization. It should also be mentioned that our study’s operationalization of younger and
older age cohorts may affect the results. For example, some studies have used age 65 as the cut-
off for defining "older" adults. Similarly, two individuals older than 40 were included in our
younger adult group. Additional limitations include the fact that some parameters were not
estimated with desirable precision (Table 2), and the fact that we did not ask participants
about their familiarity with the target websites. Although we ensured that every phishing web-
page was based on a website at which participants owned a real user account, participants may
have differed in the frequency with which they used these sites. Finally, we excluded partici-
pants with cognitive impairment, so our results cannot speak to the risk of phishing suscepti-
bility in older adults with MCI or dementia. Future research should evaluate susceptibility to
phishing in individuals with MCI, as this group will continue to grow in size with the emerging
baby-boomer cohort, many of whom are avid or frequent technology users.
Many phishing attempts are predicated upon trust and not necessarily technological sophis-
tication. As such, the current results suggest that both older and younger adults can be pro-
tected from phishing attempts through methods that provoke discomfort and suspiciousness
at the expense of automatic processing. Educational initiatives that increase phishing aware-
ness while also directly linking phishing threats to concrete negative consequences may pro-
vide the necessary skills to avoid being phished. Past research supports the use of education as
a strategy for intervention and means for decreasing vulnerability; similar initiatives have
shown promise in increasing knowledge and suspiciousness about phishing in both older and
younger adults. A training intervention employed by Sheng and colleagues showed that phish-
ing education could help reduce users’ tendency to become victims [5]. Carpenter et al.
reported that warnings are effective at reducing online personal information disclosure [56].
Kumaraguru et al. developed an email-based anti-phishing education system, PhishGuru, and
an online game, Anti-Phishing Phil, that uses learning science instructional principles to teach
users how to use cues in URLs to avoid falling into phishing attacks. Their results suggested
that an education approach facilitated the identification of phishing emails and websites [57].
In addition to the above, future research should attempt to investigate phishing susceptibility
outside of a laboratory environment where the presence of implicit trust, especially on the part
of students, may be influencing behaviors and decreasing the external validity of the results.
In conclusion, the results of this study reveal that older and younger adults both become
suspicious about phishing at approximately equal rates, a previously understudied effect within
older adults, but that the factors driving phishing susceptibility have similarities and differ-
ences between these two age cohorts. For both groups, more years of education appears to be
protective against phishing susceptibility. In older adults, lack of knowledge about phishing
and lower scores on NAB Mazes contributed to reduced suspiciousness and, presumably,
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greater susceptibility to phishing. These results also suggest an increased need for development
of ecologically valid assessment instruments to identify individuals who are most vulnerable to
phishing and similar exploits [49,50]. As access to technology continues to increase worldwide,
the potential for victimization by this technology will also increase. Neuropsychologists and
other clinicians who wish to identify individuals lacking the capacity to avoid this victimiza-
tion are in need of more ecologically valid tools than those currently available.
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